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ABSTRACT 
Determinants and Implications of Audit Reporting Lags in China 
by 
LUO Wei 
Master of Philosophy in Accounting 
 
Timeliness is an essential attribute of corporate financial reporting as it 
affects the usefulness of information made available to external 
investors. The recognition that the length of audit is the single most 
important determinant influencing the timeliness of earnings 
announcements has motivated investigations on audit reporting lags in 
different countries. Nevertheless, there is a lack of research on this issue 
in China where the institutional environment for accounting and 
auditing practices is different from that of other countries. The growing 
interest in the Chinese stock market from domestic and international 
investors further increases the importance of this research. In this study, 
I first explore the determinants of audit reporting lags in China based on 
the characteristics of the Chinese audit market and business 
environment. I then examine the implications of long audit reporting 
lags. The findings of this paper indicate that audit risk, audit complexity, 
and auditor expertise are all associated with the length of audit 
reporting lags in China. Firms with long audit reporting lags are more 
likely to have adverse consequences such as non-standard opinions and 
financial statement restatements in subsequent periods. 
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1 
DETERMINANTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF AUDIT REPORTING 
LAGS IN CHINA 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
Timeliness as one of the most important qualitative characteristics of 
accounting information requires that reliable information be made available to 
financial statement users when they need it. A lack of timeliness can lead to a 
loss of relevance and usefulness of financial information (FASB, 1980). This 
issue has received increasing attention from regulatory authorities and 
accounting researchers. Considering that a lengthy delay in the release of audited 
financial statements makes the information less valuable to investors, the US 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) announced phased reductions in 
reporting time limits from 90 days after the financial year end to 60 days (SEC, 
2002b). In China, listed companies are required to issue their audited annual 
reports to the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the related 
stock exchanges within 4 months after the financial year-end. The importance of 
timeliness has been recognized by many studies. For example, timeliness could 
have an impact on market value. Focusing on the US market, Beaver (1968) 
indicates that investors postpone their purchases and sales of the security until 
the earnings report is released. Interestingly, timeliness of the release of audit 
report can also have an impact on the accuracy of accounting information. 
2 
Bronson et al. (2011) suggest that lengthy audit lag reduces the reliability of 
preliminary earnings releases: a 20 day delay in the audit report date increases 
the probability of a PEA (preliminary earnings announcement) revision that 
indicates a decrease in earnings reliability by one percentage point. However, the 
requirement that annual financial statements be subjected to external audit can 
conflict with timely reporting because the timeliness of financial reporting 
depends on the length of the audit. It is thus important to explore the 
determinants of audit reporting lag and its implications. Most previous studies 
were conducted in the settings of developed countries or jurisdictions, such as 
the U.S. (Bronson et al., 2011; Kinney and McDaniel, 1993; Krishnan and Yang, 
2009), Australia (Davis and Whittred, 1980), and Hong Kong (Ng and Tai, 1994). 
A related study by Haw et al. (2003) examines the effect of audit opinion and 
earnings surprise on the timeliness of earnings announcements in China from 
1995 to 1999. However, they did not investigate the consequences of late 
announcements. I examine a broader set of determinants on audit reporting lag 
as well as the consequences of long audit report lag in subsequent periods, based 
on a more recent data set with an improved audit environment in China. 
 
There are several reasons for conducting this study in the context of China. 
First, the institutional environment of accounting and auditing practices in China 
is different from that of developed countries. For example, most listed firms are 
audited by Big 4 auditors in the developed markets. In recent years, the market 
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share of Big 4 has been well over 90% across the world’s G8 economies (Grant 
Thornton, 2007). In the domestic Chinese markets, however, Big 4 auditors audit 
a much smaller portion of listed firms (around 40% of the market in terms of 
revenue and 7% in terms of number of listed clients) (CICPA, 2010). Therefore, 
in contrast to prior studies which focus on Big 4 auditors, this study focuses on 
small and medium size audit firms whose audit lag could be affected by factors 
different from those of large audit firms. Furthermore, my sample data indicate 
that the standard deviation of audit reporting lags for firms that are audited by 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors are 19 days and 25 days, respectively. The larger 
variation in audit lags for non-Big 4 auditors suggests more importance in 
studying the determinants and implication of long audit reporting lag. Second, 
there is a unique advantage of conducting this research in the context of China. 
The fact that all Chinese companies have the same financial year end (December 
31) helps eliminate the confounding factor of having different year-ends for 
different companies in the study of audit report lag. For example, companies 
with year-end during the busy season for auditing may experience longer audit 
delay because of human resource constraints and scheduling problems in audit 
firms. Previous studies have documented both positive (Davis and Whittred, 
1980) and negative (Ashton, et al., 1987) relationships between audit delay and 
whether the company’s year-end date is in the audit busy season. In addition, 
when the audit is conducted at about the same time as the tax reporting, the audit 
lag may be affected by tax works. These confounding factors of having different 
4 
year-end and tax reporting season on audit reporting lag are eliminated in the 
context of China because of the uniform year-end for financial and tax reportings 
for Chinese listed companies.  
 
Third, most prior studies focus on examining the impact of company 
characteristics such as company size, industry classification, and corporate 
governance characteristics on audit report lag. This study, however, examines a 
comprehensive set of audit related characteristics.  The improvements of the 
institutional environment in China lead the auditors to attach more importance to 
enhance audit quality (Chen et al., 2010). It is then interesting to see, after an 
overall improvement in audit quality, whether specific audit characteristics 
including audit risk, audit complexity, and auditor expertise play significant roles 
in influencing audit reporting lag. Furthermore, as far as can be determined, no 
published research has examined the adverse consequences of long audit report 
lag on accounting and audit reportings in subsequent years. 
 
Lastly, the still rapid growth of the Chinese economy means that a growing 
body of domestic and international investors is interested in receiving timely and 
reliable financial information. China is now the second largest economy in terms 
of nominal GDP (Washington, 2010). The findings of this study should assist 
investors and regulatory authorities in obtaining a clearer understanding of 
factors that influence the timeliness of financial information in China. 
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During the audit process, the auditor and the client are continuously 
involved in negotiations on the treatment of various accounting issues. 
Extremely long audit lags often imply prolonged negotiations to settle 
significant disagreements between the two parties. According to the 
client-auditor negotiation literature, negotiations often result in less conservative 
reporting as auditors make compromises (Antle and Nalebuff, 1991; Gibbins et 
al., 2001). As a consequence, the problems in the accounts may not be 
eliminated after negotiation. Adverse future consequences are likely to appear 
when the existing problems are re-discovered in later years. In this study, I 
examine two future outcomes related to accounting and audit reportings for 
firms with long audit lags. The first is the receipt of non-standard audit opinion. 
When the problems in financial statements resurface in the future, auditors may 
have to issue non-standard opinions. Another future consequence is financial 
statement restatements. As suggested by Palmrose and Scholz (2004), 
restatement of financial statements is one of the most visible indicators of 
improper accounting. I examine if these future adverse events are associated 
with long audit reporting lag. 
 
Specifically, I first develop an audit reporting model which examines the 
association between audit characteristics and audit reporting lags for listed 
companies in China. Then, I develop two models to assess the consequences of 
prolonged audit lags. I find that longer audit reporting lags are significantly 
6 
associated with a higher level of audit risk, audit complexity and a lower level of 
auditor expertise. I also find that prolonged audit lags are significantly 
associated with more non-standard audit opinions and restatements of financial 
reports. 
 
The findings about the determinants of audit lags help auditors understand 
the determinants of audit delay so as to assess how the auditing process could be 
improved. The implications of prolonged audit lag help management and 
investors better understand and prepare for the adverse consequences. 
Regulatory bodies may also find the study results helpful in assessing auditing 
regulation governing the release of financial statements.  
 
 
Chapter 2 Institutional Background 
 
2.1 The Financial Reporting Environment in China 
2.1.1 Audit reporting regulation 
In China, there are several reporting regulations relevant to the audit report 
date. The 1995 Specific Independent Audit Guidelines (No.7, article 19) defines 
audit date as “the date when the CPA completes the fieldwork for the audit. The 
date of the audit report should not generally be earlier than the date when the 
entity’s management confirms and signs the financial statements” (CICPA, 
1995). In the 2003 Specific Independent Auditing Standard No. 7 (revised), 
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article 15 states that the audit date is “the date when the CPA completes audit 
work. The date of the audit report should not be earlier than the date when the 
audited entity’s management signs the accounting reports” (CICPA, 2003). In the 
Auditing Standards for the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
issued in 2007, regulation No. 1501 specifies that “The audit report should 
indicate the date of the report. This date should not be earlier than the date when 
the Certified Public Accountant obtains sufficient and appropriate audit evidence 
(including management’s acknowledgement of its responsibility for the financial 
statements and the evidence of its approval of the financial statements) and 
determines the audit opinion on the financial statements based on such evidence” 
(CICPA, 2007). In practice, CPAs usually hand in the draft audit report and the 
draft audited financial statements to management before signing the audit report 
formally. If management approves and signs the audited financial statements, the 
auditor will then sign the audit report.  
 
As to the length of the audit reporting lag, Article 66 of the Securities Law 
of the People's Republic of China (2005 Revision) specifies that “A listed 
company whose shares or bonds have been listed for trading shall, within four 
months as of the end of each accounting year, submit to the securities regulatory 
authority under the State Council and the stock exchange an annual report” 
(Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2005). The annual 
reports must be audited. Depending on the company and auditor situation, the 
audit lag could be a few weeks, but some large companies with complex 
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problems may need more time to obtain relevant information and submit the 
annual report in late April. However, if companies cannot submit annual reports 
before the deadline, they will face a variety of negative consequences. First, they 
will need to make relevant disclosures about the reasons for the delay and pay 
penalties. According to Rules Governing the Listing of Stocks on the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Exchanges, “any listed company unable to disclose its periodic 
reports within the specified time limit shall, in a timely manner, report to the 
Exchange and make public the reasons thereof, its solution plan and the deadline 
for a delayed disclosure” (Shanghai Stock Exchange, 2008; Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange, 2008). According to Article 193 of the Securities Law of the People's 
Republic of China, “Where an issuer, a listed company or any other obligor of 
information disclosure fails to disclose information according to the relevant 
provisions (including late submission of annual reports) or where there is any 
false record, misleading or major omission in the information it has disclosed, it 
shall be ordered to correct, given a warning and imposed a fine up to 600,000 
yuan. The person in charge and any other person as held to be directly 
responsible shall be given a warning and be imposed a fine up to 300,000 yuan” 
(Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2005). Second, the 
shares of the company can be suspended for trading by relevant stock exchange 
until the annual report is released. Finally, given the importance of earnings 
announcements to investors and companies, a late filing of annual report can 
cause adverse market effects. According to Bartov et al. (2011), capital markets 
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react negatively when a company files a late annual report. Chinese investors 
also use the timing pattern of annual report releases to predict future earnings as 
it has been demonstrated that firm performance is associated with the timing of 
annual report releases in China: good news firms release their annual reports 
earlier than bad news firms, and loss firms release their annual reports the latest 
(Haw et al. 2000). 
 
2.1.2 Financial Statement Restatement and Audit Opinion 
The restatement regulations in China have become more stringent over the 
years. The first restatement standard is the 1999 Standard of Changes in 
Accounting Policies and Estimates, and Corrections of Material Accounting 
Errors. Section 3 of the standard gives a description of the restatement methods 
and requires the disclosure of restatement amount and reasons in the footnotes of 
the financial statements (Ministry of Finance, 1999). In 2003, the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission issued Rules on Information Disclosure for 
Listed Companies No.19 - The Correction of Financial Information and its 
Disclosure. This regulation requires that listed companies use Provisional 
Announcement of Significant Matters to report restated financial information 
(CSRC, 2003). In 2006, Accounting Standards of Business Enterprises, Changes 
in Accounting Policies and Estimates, and Corrections of Accounting Errors 
requires that a restatement revises all the affected line items in the financial 
statements for all relevant periods (Ministry of Finance, 2006). According to 
Wong and Wu (2011), the reasons for Chinese firms to issue restatements can be 
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classified into 8 categories: mistakes from subsidiaries, tax miscalculation, 
misstatement of costs and expenses, misstatement of depreciation and provisions, 
revenue recognition problems, subsidiaries revenue and book-tax conforming 
adjustments, and other mistakes and misclassiﬁcations. There could be many 
potential negative consequences of financial statement restatements such as 
damage to corporate image, reduced confidence by investors on published 
financial statements, and a drop in credit rating. Wei et al. (2009) find that 
market reactions to restatement announcements are negative in China. The types 
of announcement that generate significant negative market reactions include 
announcements that are caused by serious accounting problems or are related to 
core accounting indicators, and announcements that significantly reduce 
earnings or show important bad news
1
.  
 
There are 5 categories of audit opinion in China: standard unqualified 
opinion, unqualified opinion with explanatory notes, qualified opinion, adverse 
opinion, and disclaimer of opinion. In this study, non-standard audit opinions 
include all audit opinions except for unqualified opinions. If a listed company 
receives a non-standard opinion, the company could suffer negative regulatory 
and economic consequences. First, according to Compilation Rules for 
Information Disclosures by Companies That Offer Securities to the Public No.14，
Audit Opinions That Are Not Standard and Unqualified and the Handling of 
                                                             
1 Announcements that are caused by serious accounting problems refer to the 
supplements or corrections for issues relevant to major accounting policies and 
changes in accounting estimates that could affect audit opinion.  
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Relevant Matters，“where the company has obviously violated the accounting 
standards, rules or relevant information disclosure requirements and such 
violation would, if not rectified, cause the registered accountant to issue an audit 
opinion that is not standard and unqualified, the registered accountant shall point 
that out and request the company to make necessary adjustments (Article 6). If 
the company refuses to do so or if the adjustment is not adequate and the 
accountant consequently issues an audit opinion that is not standard and 
unqualified, the stock exchange may suspend trading of the shares of the 
company (Article 7). During the suspension, the relevant matters will be 
investigated and dealt with by the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(Article 8)” (CSRC, 2001). Furthermore, it has been found that investors do 
value audit opinions (Fargher and Wilkins, 1998; Soltani, 2000). According to 
Chen et al. (2000), the stock market reacts negatively to non-standard opinions 
in China. 
 
2.2 The Audit Environment in China 
2.2.1 The Development of Auditing Standards in China 
In the 1990s, there were some voluntary auditing standards issued by the 
Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants (CICPA) and the Chinese 
Association of Certified Public Auditors (CACPA). However, a series of 
financial frauds necessitated the need to monitor auditors more closely and to 
better achieve international harmonization. Therefore, the China Independent 
Auditing Standards Commission (CIASC) was formed in 1994. In 1995, the first 
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batch of China’s Independent Auditing Standards (CIASs) was issued to improve 
the quality and credibility of auditing in China. According to Lin and Chan 
(2000), Chinese auditing standards are similar to international standards and 
guidelines in many respects because the emerging Chinese accounting 
profession adopted the well-established international standards and guidelines 
with little change. The CIASs are legally binding on all certified public 
accountants who conduct audit to give an opinion on the financial statements 
prepared by management (Cooper et al. 2002). 
 
2.2.2 The Chinese Audit Market 
China’s audit firms were affiliated with the government before 1998. This 
affiliation often resulted in a lack of independence and regional protectionism. 
Realizing the importance of establishing an independent audit profession, the 
Ministry of Finance and the China Securities Regulatory Commission issued 
regulations to disaffiliate audit firms from government agencies by 1998. After 
this disaffiliation reform, while there are improvements, the personnel of audit 
firms still have close relationship with local governments. Audit quality and 
independence continue to be influenced by government. (Chan et al., 2006) In 
addition, the intense competition of China’s audit market gives clients more 
bargaining power while imposing more business pressure on auditors. According 
to Chen et al. (2010), at the end of 2006 73 audit ﬁrms in China were eligible to 
audit about 1400 listed companies. In other words, one qualiﬁed ﬁrm had less 
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than 20 listed customers to audit. A series of scandals involving earnings 
manipulation and fraudulent financial reporting were exposed around 2001. This 
led to a series of regulatory improvements to protect investors. As a result, 
litigation and sanction risks faced by Chinese auditors have risen significantly. 
According to Chen et al. (2010), auditors were less likely to compromise quality 
for economic benefits from important clients in the post-2001 period as the 
institutional environment became more protective for investors.  
 
Lastly, the Chinese audit market is different from audit markets in the 
developed countries as it is not dominated by the Big 4 auditors. According to 
the ranking of accounting firms disclosed by the CICPA (2010), the market share 
of Big 4 auditors in China is only 44.3% when measured by total revenue and 
43.9% when measured by audit income in 2009.  
 
Chapter 3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 
3.1 Audit Characteristics and Audit Reporting Lag 
Facing higher audit risks, auditors might increase the number of audit 
procedures and devote more time in discussions and negotiations with their 
clients. As a result, the length of the audit reporting lag will be increased. Chan 
et al. (2012) found that the adopters of clawback (or compensation recovery) 
provisions, which lead to lower audit risk, experience shorter audit lags. Low 
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profitability or losses are signals of problems in the operation of a company, and 
they could increase the likelihood of financial failure or management fraud. As a 
consequence, audit risk is increased. Courtis (1976) found that profitability 
significantly explains the difference between slow and fast reporters. Ashton et 
al. (1989) found longer delays for companies reporting net losses. Bamber et al. 
(1993) found that companies in financial distress tend to have longer audit 
reporting lags. In this paper, leverage is also viewed as an indicator of a firm’s 
financial stability and could be positively related to audit risks. A high total debt 
to total asset ratio could increase the risk of financial failure of a company and 
auditors tend to spend more time evaluating the operation of such a company. 
However, it could also be argued that high leverage attracts more attention and 
monitoring from creditors and should be associated with less audit risk. Altman’s 
Z score, a measure of bankruptcy risk, is also included as an indicator of audit 
risk. Finally, whether the audited company has pending litigation can have an 
impact on the risk of the audit. I consider the existence of contingent liabilities 
an indicator of such risk. The above discussion leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
H1: Companies with a higher level of audit risk have longer audit lags than 
companies with a lower level of audit risk. 
 
Audit complexity can be another determinant of the length of audit lags. If 
the business of the audited entity is very complex, it can take the auditors more 
15 
time to collect and process information. Leventis et al. (2005) found that audit 
reporting lag is positively associated with the existence of extraordinary items 
which increases audit complexity. Ng and Tai (1994) used the number of 
principal subsidiary companies held by a company to represent complexity and 
diversification of business operation, and they found that complexity is 
positively related to audit reporting lag. In this study, it is expected that a higher 
audit fee is associated with a more complex audit because audit fee is an 
indicator of the time and effort devoted to the audit, and it should be positively 
related to a company’s level of business complexity (Hanlon et al., 2012). The 
issuance of a non-standard opinion also increases audit complexity. According to 
Whittred (1980), auditors might try to avoid issuing a non-standard opinion by 
increasing the number of audit procedures to reduce any uncertainty or 
disagreement. Management might also try to avoid a non-standard opinion by 
discussing and negotiating with the auditors more frequently or in greater depth. 
Either way, audit complexity is increased. The above discussion leads to the 
second hypothesis: 
 
H2: Companies with a higher level of audit complexity have longer audit delays 
than companies with a lower level of audit complexity. 
 
As for the association between auditor expertise and audit reporting lag, 
large auditors such as the Big 4 auditors are expected to have more efficient 
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audit planning, better human resources and more experience in auditing and thus 
represent higher audit expertise. According to Ashton et al. (1989), large auditors 
finish the audit quicker because of their expertise. In addition, auditor expertise 
can be related to the auditor’s experience with a company. A change in auditor 
could imply lower auditor expertise as a new auditor has less experience in 
auditing the company and is less knowledgeable about the company’s operation 
and accounting procedures. According to Tanyi et al. (2010), audit report lags 
change after either voluntary or involuntary auditor switches. According to Ng 
and Tai (1994), the length of audit lag is positively associated with a change in 
auditor probably because the newly appointed audit firm needs time to 
familiarize itself with the company and to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses 
of the internal control system.  The above discussion leads to the third 
hypothesis: 
 
H3: Auditors with more expertise have shorter audit lags than auditors with less 
expertise.  
 
3.2 Audit Reporting Lag and Adverse Outcomes 
Long audit reporting lags imply intense negotiation between the managers 
and the auditors to resolve their disagreements. According to Antle and Nalebuff 
(1991), an auditor’s initial offer in the negotiation can be conservative. However, 
if management feel that they know better about the state of the company’s 
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financial condition, they may protest or try to change the adjustments made by 
the auditor that result in understatements of income, while remaining silent on 
adjustments that cause overstatements of income. As a consequence, only 
income increasing adjustments are left unopposed. Utilizing an analytical model, 
Antle and Nalebuff (1991) demonstrate that as auditing contracts are designed to 
maximize joint auditor-client surplus, the expected ex post bias is always upward. 
In other words, after negotiation, the auditors tend to be less conservative and 
the result is more aggressive financial reporting. According to Gibbins et al. 
(2001), management views the negotiation as a win-lose situation and intend to 
persuade the auditors. Auditor’s acquiescence or compromise is often expected. 
As problems in the financial statements often continue to exist after the 
negotiation, there will likely be adverse consequences when these problems 
resurface in the future. Non-standard audit opinions and financial statement 
restatements are used as indicators of adverse future consequences in this study. 
The above discussion leads to the fourth and fifth hypotheses: 
 
H4: Companies with long audit reporting lags are more likely to receive 
non-standard audit opinions in subsequent years than companies with short audit 
reporting lags. 
 
H5: Companies with long audit reporting lags are more likely to have financial 
statement restatements in subsequent years than companies with short audit 
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reporting lags. 
 
Chapter 4 Research Methodology 
 
Three regression models are developed. The first model examines the 
determinants of audit reporting lags. The second and third models examine the 
relationship between long audit reporting lags and two future adverse 
consequences. The first model is specified as follows: 
 
Auditlagt = α0 + α1 Audit_riskt + α2Audit_complexityt + α3 Audit_expertiset + 
∑αjControl variablest +ε                                          (1)                                                       
 
where Audit_risk is measured by (1) Assetreturn: the ratio of earnings before 
interest and taxes to total assets; (2) Loss: an indicator variable if net income is 
less than zero; (3) Leverage: the ratio of total debt to total assets; and (4) Zscore: 
Altman’s Z-score: a measure of bankruptcy risk2; (5) Contingent_liability: an 
indicator variable if a company has contingent liability. Auditor_complexity is 
measured by (1) Audit_fee: the natural logarithm of total audit fee; and (2) 
Opinion: an indicator variable if the company does not receive a standard 
opinion. Audit_expertise is measured by (1) Auditor: an indicator variable if the 
                                                             
2 
Z-score = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.999X5, where X1 is working 
capital (current assets less current liabilities) to total assets, X2 is retained 
earnings divided by total assets, X3 is earnings before interest and taxes divided 
by total assets, X4 is market value of equity divided by total liabilities, and X5 is 
total operating revenue divided by total assets 
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auditor of a company is not a Big 4 auditor; and (2) Change: An indicator 
variable when there is a switch of the company’s external auditor.  
 
Following previous research, six categories of control variables known to 
influence audit reporting lag are included:  
 
(1) Corporate Governance 
Several studies explored the relationship between audit delay and corporate 
governance characteristics. For example, Mohamad, et al. (2010) examined 
whether characteristics of the board of directors and the audit committee are 
related to the timeliness of audit reporting, and find that audit committee size and 
the number of audit committee meetings are negatively associated with audit 
reporting lag, while the proportion of independent directors on the board has a 
positive relationship with audit lag. 
 
In the context of China, the importance of board independence has been 
emphasized. In August 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) released the Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the 
Board of Directors of Listed Companies (CSRC, 2001). According to the 
Guideline, by June 30
th
, 2002, at least two members of the board of directors 
shall be independent directors. At least one third of board shall be independent 
directors by June 30
th
, 2003. In this study, the percentage of independent 
directors on the board, the number of board meetings, and the ownership 
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concentration are included to control for the impact of corporate governance on 
audit lag. It is expected that a more independent board that has more frequent 
board meetings will oversee the financial reporting process more closely and 
ensure a more timely submission of financial statements.  
 
As to ownership concentration, Chinese companies are characterized by a 
highly concentrated ownership structure which could have two effects on audit 
reporting lags. On one hand, when the ownership entrenchment effect is 
dominant, the controlling shareholders may have self serving behavior at the 
expense of outside shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2002) and tend to cover up such 
behavior by withholding unfavorable information or deferring the release of 
financial reports. As a result, under the entrenchment perspective, the audit 
reporting lag should be longer for firms with a high level of ownership 
concentration. On the other hand, if the incentive alignment effect is dominant, 
controlling shareholders might be encouraged to facilitate the release of financial 
information to benefit minority shareholders. For example, Gomes (2000) 
indicates that high concentration may lead to the controlling shareholders’ 
commitment toward a reputation of not expropriating minority shareholders. 
Therefore, under the incentive alignment perspective, the audit reporting lag 
should be shorter for firms with a high level of ownership concentration.  
(2) Earnings Surprise 
Previous studies have shown that the timing of a company’s earnings 
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announcements is related to whether the earnings convey good news or bad 
news (Givoly and Palmon, 1982). Generally, a company tends to be more willing 
to disclose earnings announcement early when the earnings convey good news 
and contain large positive earnings surprise. In this study, I include Goodnews 
(an indicator variable if net income is not smaller than forecast net income) and 
Surprise (the difference between actual earnings per share and forecast earnings 
per share) to control for the impact of earnings surprise on audit reporting lag.  
 
(3) Information Demands  
It is anticipated that larger companies attract more attention from the public 
and have more pressure to issue financial reports in a timely fashion so that they 
can meet the information demands of investors, trade unions and regulatory 
agencies. The negative relationship between corporate size and audit reporting 
lag has been documented by previous studies (Carslaw and Kaplan, 1991; Ng 
and Tai, 1994). Therefore, company size is included as a control variable in the 
model. Furthermore, if a firm is concurrently listed on more than one stock 
exchange, its financial information will be followed by more investors and this 
may pressure the firms and the auditors into issuing financial statements earlier. 
On the other hand, as the financial information is used by more investors, the 
auditor may want to be more cautious because of increased litigation risks. It is, 
therefore, an empirical issue as to how the listings on more than one stock 
exchange could influence audit lag. I include an indicator variable if the shares 
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of a firm are traded simultaneously on more than one stock exchange to capture 
this effect.  
 
(4) Earnings Quality  
Companies with low earnings quality are expected to be less willing to 
disclose their financial information on time. Krishnan and Yang (2009) found 
evidence that companies with high audit lags had slightly higher levels of 
absolute discretionary accruals which suggests lower earnings quality. In this 
study, an indicator variable is included for companies issuing restatements to 
control for the influence of earnings quality, as restatements are usually 
associated with misreporting of financial statements (Rezaee, 2002). In this study, 
I also consider the influence of regulatory pressure on earnings quality. In China, 
companies in the finance and public utilities industries are subject to more 
regulatory pressure. For example, the financial industry is monitored by the 
China Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory 
Commission, China Banking Regulatory Commission, and the People’s Bank of 
China. The public utilities industry is regulated by institutions such as State 
Electricity Regulatory Commission. Since these industries are more closely and 
strictly supervised by authorities, their earnings quality could be higher. Their 
management may want to have their audit reports issued sooner. On the other 
hand, as the regulatory bodies have more specific regulations and requirements 
regarding the audit and financial reporting of companies in such industries, it 
23 
may take the auditors more time to complete the audit in accordance with the 
regulations. More regulations could also cause more earnings manipulations 
when regulations are based on accounting numbers and thus result in longer 
reporting lags. An indicator variable is used if a company belongs to highly 
regulated sectors to account for the impact of regulatory pressure on audit 
reporting lag.  
 
(5) Chinese Characteristics 
Apart from variables that are found to be associated with audit delay in 
previous studies, specific Chinese characteristics that may affect audit reporting 
lags are included: A. Tradable Shares. One feature of listed companies in China 
is that they have two types of shares: tradable shares and non-tradable shares. A 
higher percentage of tradable shares indicate a greater number of investors who 
rely on financial reports to make decisions. The auditor will face higher 
litigation risk as the number of investors increase. This could result in more 
workload and longer audit reporting lag. However, it could also be argued that a 
larger number of external investors will increase the pressure on management to 
shorten the audit reporting lag so that financial statements can be released more 
timely. B. State Ownership. It is widely known that many Chinese firms are 
state-owned or only partially privatized despite a series of economic reforms. 
This characteristic could have an influence on audit reporting lag. On one hand, 
the government as the largest owner could impose a high level of pressure on the 
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firm to submit financial reports in a timely fashion. On the other hand, state 
ownership may imply inefficiency in management as state-owned firms are often 
used by government institutions for political purposes such as a means of 
channeling benefits to supporters. An inefficient management team might be less 
willing to disclose their problematic financial information to the public. I use an 
indicator variable if the largest shareholder is the government to control for the 
influence of state ownership on audit delay.  
 
(6) Year and Industry Dummies 
These variables are used to control for year and industry effects. I have six 
year dummies and six industry dummies included in the regression models. 
 
The other two hypotheses will be tested by the following models: 
Opiniont=γ0 + γ1 Long_audit_lagt-1 +∑γjControl variables +ε             (2)                
 
Restatementt =β0+ β1 Long_audit_lagt-1 ∑βjControl variables + ε         (3)                 
 
In the second model, Opiniont is an indicator variable which equals one if 
the company receives a non-standard opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. 
Long_Audit_lagt-1 is an indicator variable defined by: A. firms with the top 5% 
longest audit lag (the number of days between the year-end and the date on 
which an audit report is signed). B. firms with the top 10% longest audit lag. C. 
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firms with the top 15% longest audit lag. The control variables are chosen 
following previous studies on determinants of non-standard opinion: current year 
audit opinion, profitability (measured by the ratio of earnings before interest and 
taxes to total assets), loss, revenue (measured by total operating revenue), 
leverage, bankruptcy risk, company size, auditor (whether the auditor is a Big 4 
auditor), cash flow (whether there is any negative operating cash flow), and 
equity (whether there is any negative book value of equity) (Mutchler et al. 1997; 
Reynolds and Francis, 2000).  
 
In the third model, Restatementt is an indicator variable which equals 1 if a 
company restates its financial statements in year t, and zero otherwise. The 
independent variable is Long_Audit_lagt-1. Several important determinants of 
restatement (in year t) are included in the model as control variables. First, I 
control for current year restatements in year (t-1). I also control for operational 
risk using the ratio of inventory to total assets. According to Kinney and 
McDaniel (1989) and Defond and Jiambalvo (1991), the probability of 
restatement is associated with profitability, earnings growth (measured by 
growth rate of return on equity), loss, leverage, bankruptcy risk (measured by 
Altman’s Z score), company size, opinion, and auditor. I also choose control 
variables based on studies conducted in the Chinese context. According to Wei et 
al. (2010), the location of the stock exchange and whether a Chinese company is 
classified as ST (Special Treatment) firms are associated with restatements. ST 
firms are companies receiving special treatment on the stock exchange because 
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of financial difficulties. A list of variable definitions is given in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Chapter 5 Data Collection 
 
The sample data consist of companies that issue A and B shares on the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. I extract accounting data from the 
China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. The sample 
period covers a recent six-year period, 2004-2009. Audit reports were issued in 
2010 on the 2009 financial statements. I started from 2004 because the CICPA 
published the Guidance on the Practice Criteria for Certified Public Accountants 
of China No.5 – Audit Report in 2003. This document gives detailed guidance 
about audit dates. When a CPA decides the audit date, he or she should consider 
the following factors: the audit procedures should have been completed; issues 
that should be adjusted or published by the audited entity have been proposed 
and the audited entity has agreed or refused to make the adjustments or 
publications; the management of the audited entity has formally signed the 
accounting statements (CICPA, 2003). This detailed guidance facilitates the 
auditors’ determination the appropriate audit report date. In addition, among the 
9153 firm year observations, around 4000 of them are dropped from the sample 
due to the lack of analysts’ forecast data in measuring the earnings news 
variables. 
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Chapter 6 Empirical Results 
 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable: 
audit reporting lag. The mean audit lag for all firm year observations is 87.06 
days. This level of audit delay is longer than those reported in previous studies 
for other countries. According to Ettredge et al. (2006), the mean audit delay for 
the U.S. companies is 50 days in 2003 and 70 days in 2004. According to Ashton 
et al. (1989), Canadian companies have a mean audit delay of 55 days. The 
longer audit reporting lag in China may be explained by the relatively liberal 
requirement of submitting annual reports within 120 days after the financial year 
end while the USA and Canada have a stricter 90-day requirement. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
As can be observed from the histogram in Figure 1, the mean audit lag for 
year 2004 was the shortest: 84.82 days. It then rose to about 87 days in the 
following two years. In 2007, the audit lag slightly decreased to 86.6 days. Year 
2008 (audit report issued in 2009) experienced the longest audit lag: 89.52 days. 
The 2008 financial crisis might account for this unprecedented audit delay. As 
many companies suffered huge losses or had financial difficulties because of the 
crisis, auditors had to devote more time investigating financial statements for 
potential problems or the companies may want to postpone the release of bad 
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news. In 2009 (audit report issued in 2010), the mean audit lag was reduced to 
85.68 days.  
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Table 2 panel B presents the descriptive statistics for all the independent 
variables. 14% companies experienced losses which might lead to longer audit 
delay. The average leverage level for Chinese companies is 55% which is higher 
than that of other countries: US firms have a leverage of 20% for family firms 
and 24% for non-family firms (Chen et al., 2010); French firms have a leverage 
of 23% (Aubert, F., 2009); Malaysian firms have a leverage of 44% (Yaacob, 
N.M., 2012); New Zealand firms have a leverage of 46% (Carslaw and Kaplan, 
1991). This is perhaps because of government control of Chinese companies. 
About eighteen percent of companies had contingent liabilities that may increase 
audit risk. Nine percent of listed companies received non-standard audit opinion. 
Companies have about ten subsidiaries on average. Only 7% of listed companies 
employed Big 4 auditors and this reveals a highly competitive audit market in 
China. Also, 9% of companies switched their auditors during the sampling 
period. The average percentage of tradable shares for Chinese companies is 53%. 
In over 50% of the firms, the largest shareholder is state related. This reveals that 
the Chinese government plays a significant role in controlling listed companies. 
The average holding percentage of the largest shareholder is 38%. This reveals a 
highly concentrated ownership structure in China. The average percentage of 
independent directors is 36% which satisfies the 1/3 independent board members 
29 
requirement. The board of directors has about 8 meetings per year and, on 
average, about 45% companies have good news or receive higher earnings than 
expected. These companies may be more willing to accelerate the release of 
annual reports. On average, companies receive 8% lower earnings per share 
(EPS) than forecast EPS. Finally, 11% of listed companies had restatements 
which could result in long audit reporting lags. 
 
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix for all variables. First, audit lag is 
significantly correlated with many of the experimental variables. For example, 
audit lag is significantly negatively correlated with asset return and Zscore, 
while significantly positively correlated with the existence of losses, leverage 
level, the existence of contingent liabilities, the receipt of non-standard opinion 
and audit fee. Audit lag is also significantly positively related to an auditor 
change. It is interesting to observe that the audit lag is significantly negatively 
related to a non-Big 4 auditor. This is not consistent with the expectation that a 
non-Big 4 auditor with a lower level of audit expertise should have a longer 
audit lag. However, as non-Big 4 auditors suffer less from reputation losses, they 
may cut short their auditing process to save costs. In addition, the dependent 
variable, audit lag, is significantly correlated to many control variables. For 
example, audit lag is found to be significantly positively related to the 
percentage of tradable shares. This result supports the proposition that there is a 
higher litigation risk faced by the auditors of companies that have a larger 
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number of tradable shares which in turn results in more workload and longer 
audit reporting lag. State ownership is significantly negatively correlated with 
audit lag. This result suggests that government as a controlling shareholder could 
probably impose higher pressure on companies and ensure a timely submission 
of financial reports. Audit lag is significantly negatively correlated with 
ownership concentration suggesting that the alignment effect dominants the 
entrenchment effect and large shareholders can impose more pressure on 
companies to submit financial statements timely. Audit lag is significantly 
negatively correlated with the number of board meetings, suggesting that better 
corporate governance could promote timely reporting. It is found that audit lag is 
significantly negatively related to good news and earnings surprise. This is 
consistent with the expectation that companies tend to accelerate the auditing 
process when there is positive information contained in the earnings 
announcements. Finally, companies with concurrent listings on more than one 
stock exchange are found to have significantly longer audit lag. The auditors 
may increase the audit time for such companies because of higher litigation risk. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
6.2 Determinants of Audit Reporting Lag 
Table 4 presents the multivariate regression result for the determinants of 
audit reporting lag. The industry and year dummies are included in the model but 
not tabulated. The result shows that asset return is significantly negatively 
related to audit reporting lag. That is, a higher profitability which indicates a 
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lower level of audit risk results in shorter audit delay. As expected, the existence 
of contingent liabilities suggesting the possible existence of pending litigations 
is significantly positively related to audit lag as such problems increase the audit 
risk. Thus, the result supports the first hypothesis that companies with a higher 
level of audit risk have longer audit lags than companies with a lower level of 
audit risk. I also observe that the receipt of a non-standard opinion, audit fee and 
number of subsidiaries which imply more audit complexity are all significantly 
positively associated with audit lag. This result supports the second hypothesis 
that companies with a higher level of audit complexity have longer audit delays 
than companies with a lower level of audit complexity. Finally, auditor change 
which indicates a lower level of audit expertise is significantly associated with 
the length of audit lag with the expected positive sign, supporting the third 
hypothesis.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Regarding the control variables, one of the corporate governance 
characteristics – the number of board meetings - is found to be significantly 
negatively related to audit lag. This is consistent with the expectation that stricter 
corporate governance tends to ensure a more timely submission of financial 
statements. It is also found that good_news is significantly negatively related to 
the length of audit lag. This is consistent with the expectation that companies 
tend to accelerate the release of good news. Firms with high regulatory pressures 
have significantly shorter audit delay probably because the regulatory bodies 
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supervise the financial reporting of such companies more strictly. 
6.3 Consequences of Long Audit Reporting Lag 
As mentioned earlier, two adverse consequences of long audit reporting lag 
are examined in this study. Table 5 Panel A presents the findings for the 
association between the receipt of non-standard opinion and long audit lag. In all 
three models, I found that long audit lag is significantly positively related to the 
receipt of non-standard audit opinion in the following year. In addition, most 
control variables are also significantly related to the dependent variable with the 
expected signs. For example, firms receiving non-standard opinions in the 
previous year are more likely to receive non-standard opinions in the current 
year. Firms with lower profitability, more losses, lower revenue, higher leverage, 
and negative equity and cash flows are more likely to be issued a non-standard 
opinion.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Table 5 Panel B presents the findings for the association between financial 
statement restatement and long audit lag. It is found that restatement in the 
subsequent year is significantly positively associated with long audit reporting 
lag in the 5% definition option. However, in the 10% and 15% cases, the 
associations are not significant possibly because some of the audit lags are not 
abnormally long in these two cases. Interestingly, I found that companies listed 
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are more likely to make restatements. This is 
probably because companies listed on this exchange are larger companies that 
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are subject to more scrutiny from auditors and the public.  
 
To summarize, the empirical results support hypotheses four and five. 
Companies should be alerted that a prolonged audit lag could be associated with 
adverse consequences including the receipt of non-standard opinion and 
financial statement restatement in the subsequent year.  
 
Chapter 7 Sensitivity Tests 
 
7.1 Exclude “ST” Firms 
In March, 1998, China's Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) started 
a policy to give “special treatment” to firms with abnormal financial problems. 3 
These firms are then called “ST” firms. This policy reminds the investors that 
they need to pay special attention to default risk. Because of “ST” firms’ 
abnormal financial condition, some studies exclude such firms to reduce their 
irregular influence on regression results. In this study, I re-examine the 
determinants of audit lags in China after excluding “ST” firms.  
 
As can be observed from Table 6 (Panel A) the regression results are not 
                                                             
3
 ST firms are subject to the following “treatments”: 
1. The company’s share and its derivatives will be designated as “ST”, and its 
trading quotation is to be published in another board.  
2. The daily quotation fluctuation for the company’s share is limited to 5%.  
3. During the period of “special treatment”, the company’s middle-term report 
must be audited (Bai, et al., 2002). 
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significantly different from those in Table 4. Asset return and contingent liability 
are significantly related to audit lag with expected signs suggesting that higher 
audit risks are associated with longer audit lags. The receipt of non-standard 
opinion, audit fee, and number of subsidiaries are significantly positively related 
to audit lags. This result supports that audit complexity is positively associated 
with audit lags. It is also found a change in auditor is significantly positively 
associated with audit lag at the 10% significance level. Therefore, all three 
hypotheses are supported by the sensitivity test result. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
7.2 Drop of Earnings Surprise Variables 
The lack of analysts’ forecast data reduces the sample size by about 4000 
observations. Therefore, in the second sensitivity test, I drop the two earnings 
surprise variables and re-examine the first model. The results shown in Table 6 
(Panel B) are not significantly different from those in Table 4. Asset return is 
significantly negatively related to audit lag while the existence of loss is 
significantly positively related to audit lag. The first hypothesis is supported. 
The receipt of non-standard audit opinion, audit fee, and number of subsidiaries 
are all significantly positively related to audit lag. This result indicates that 
higher audit complexity is associated with longer audit lag. A change in auditor 
is significantly positively related to audit lag, and the third hypothesis is 
supported.  
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7.3 Auditor Change (Alternative Definition) 
In the third sensitivity test, I re-examine the determinants of audit lags in 
China after adjusting the auditor change variable. Specifically, because switches 
from a non-Big 4 auditor to a Big 4 auditor may not indicate a decrease of audit 
expertise, I exclude such cases from my analysis. The result shown in Table 6 
(Panel C) is not significantly different from that of the original model in Table 4. 
Asset return and the existence of contingent liabilities are significantly related to 
audit lag with the expected signs, and the first hypothesis is supported. The 
receipt of non-standard audit opinion, audit fee, and number of subsidiaries are 
all significantly positively related to audit lag as expected. Finally, the 
significantly positive association between auditor change and audit lag supports 
the third hypothesis. 
 
7.4 Audit Opinion (Alternative Definition) 
In a sensitivity test for Model 2, I classified the “unqualified opinion with 
emphasis of matter paragraph” opinion as standard opinion instead of 
non-standard opinion as in Table 5, (Panel A). As can be observed in Table 6 
(Panel D), there is no change in the relationship between the experimental 
variables and the dependent variable when the first definition option for long 
audit lag is adopted. That is, firms with the top 5% longest audit lag are more 
likely to receive non-standard opinions in the subsequent year even with this 
re-classification of audit opinion. 
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7.5 Non-standard Audit Opinion and Long_Audit_Lag (t-2) 
In a sensitivity test for both models 2 and 3, I changed the test variable from 
long_audit_lag (t-1) to long_audit_lag (t-2) to examine whether abnormally long 
audit reporting lag would still result in the receipt of non-standard opinion or 
financial statement restatement after two years. As can be observed from the 
Table 6 (Panels E and F), the relationships between long_audit_lag (t-2) and the 
receipt of non-standard opinion are significant in all three definitions of 
long_audit_lag. However, I do not find significant relationships between 
long_audit_lag (t-2) and restatement.  
 
7.6 Restatements (Exclusion of trivial restatements) 
In China, restatements could be triggered by trivial issues not affecting 
accounting numbers in the financial statements. For example, disclosures of 
clerical errors, supplementary information, explanatory information, and change 
of accounting policy are all included in restatements. I re-define the restatement 
variable in Model 3 by excluding less relevant restatements: in Table 6 (Panel G), 
restatements about clerical errors are excluded, and the result shows that long 
audit lag is significantly positively associated with restatements in the first 
definition option, i.e. top 5% of audit lag. In Table 6 (Panel H), restatements that 
correct for clerical errors, disclose explanatory, supplementary, and change of 
accounting policy information are excluded. The result shows that long audit lag 
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is also significantly positively related to restatement in the first definition option, 
i.e. top 5% of audit lag.  
 
Chapter 8 Conclusion and Implications 
 
This paper examines the determinants of audit reporting lags in China and 
the consequences of long audit reporting lags. Audit reporting lags are found to 
be significantly associated with audit risk, audit complexity, and audit expertise. 
Specifically, a higher level of audit risk and audit complexity and a lower level 
of audit expertise are associated with longer audit delay. Since all Chinese listed 
firms have the same financial year end, I am able to assess the determinants of 
audit reporting lag without the confounding effects of differing balance sheet 
dates. I also found that the more frequent issuance of non-standard opinion and 
accounting restatements after a firm has a prolonged audit lag. Prolonged audit 
delay implies intensive negotiations between auditors and the management. 
Even though agreements may finally be reached between the auditor and the 
management, potential problems in the financial statements are often detected in 
subsequent years and can have adverse consequences.  
 
There are two additional implications from this research. For management, 
they should be more careful in examining the causes of prolonged audit delay in 
an attempt to reduce or avoid adverse consequences. To the regulators, as 54% 
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of the listed companies in China actually take not more than 3 months to 
complete their financial statement audit, the 120-day requirement may be too 
generous. Also, the 120-day requirement may unnecessarily reduce the 
timeliness of the release of accounting information in China. For example, 
companies may strategically delay the release of bad news for as long as 
possible. Therefore, regulatory authorities may consider shortening the 120-day 
requirement to be more compatible with international practice and to insure that 
the published financial statements are timely and useful for investors. 
 
I acknowledge several limitations in this study. First, there are many 
different measures of audit risk, audit complexity, and audit expertise. While the 
measures used in this study represent the more direct measures and they are 
supported by prior literature, I do not include all possible measures. Some 
measures used can by classified under either audit risk or complexity. Some 
control variables also can affect audit risk and complexity. Nevertheless, even if 
I re-classify some measures from audit risk to audit complexity (or vice versa) or 
from control variables to experimental variables, my test results indicate that the 
conclusions on the hypotheses will not change. Second, I did not examine the 
capital market effect of long audit delay because this specific consequence was 
studied in prior literature and I want to focus on the accounting and audit 
reporting consequences that have not been examined in prior studies.  
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Finally, while litigation is an important factor driving audit reporting lag in 
the US, litigations for Chinese companies are not as widespread. Some Chinese 
companies are reluctant to disclose such contingencies. I have included a 
contingent liability variable to account for this effect. Limited disclosure by 
Chinese companies on litigation precludes a more elaborated analysis on this 
issue. 
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Table 1  
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Asset_return The ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total 
assets 
Audit_fee The natural logarithm of total audit fee 
Auditor An indicator variable if the auditor is a non-Big 4 auditor 
Cash_flow 
An indicator variable if the operating cash flow is 
negative 
Change An indicator variable if the company's external auditor is 
switched 
Concentration Holding percentage of the largest shareholder 
Contingent_liability 
An indicator variable if the company has any contingent 
liability 
Equity 
An indicator variable if the book value of equity is 
negative  
Exchange 
An indicator variable if the shares of a firm are traded 
simultaneously on more than one stock exchange  
Good_news 
An indicator variable if net income is not smaller than 
forecast net income 
Growth_rate Growth rate of return on equity 
Ln_audit_lag  Natural logarithm of the number of days between client’s 
fiscal year-end and the audit report date 
Independent The percentage of independent directors on the board 
Inventory The ratio of inventory to total assets 
Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets 
Location An indicator variable if a firm is listed on the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange 
Long_audit_lag An indicator variable for firms with the top 5%, 10%, and 
15% longest audit lag 
Loss An indicator variable if net income is less than zero 
Nmeeting Number of board meetings 
Nsubsidiaries Number of subsidiaries 
Opinion An indicator variable if the company does not receive a 
standard opinion 
Regulatory_ 
Pressure 
An indicator variable if the company belongs to highly 
regulated sectors  
Restatement An indicator variable for companies announcing financial 
statements restatements 
Revenue Natural logarithm of total operating revenue 
STfirm An indicator variable if a firm is classified as "ST" firm 
Surprise 
The difference between actual earnings per share and 
forecast earnings per share 
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Switch An indicator variable when the company’s external 
auditor is switched 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets 
State_owned An indicator variable if the largest shareholder is the 
government 
Tshare The percentage of tradable shares 
Zscore Altman's Z score 
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Table 2  
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Dependent Variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overall Statistics  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
audit_lag     8952 87.06 24.23 0   241 
accounting_year 2004           
audit_lag  1351 84.82 26.09 9 223 
accounting_year 2005           
audit_lag  1317 87.83 24.51 0 241 
accounting_year 2006           
audit_lag  1448 87.87 24.49 10 119 
accounting_year 2007           
audit_lag  1545 86.60 25.19 10 239 
accounting_year 2008           
audit_lag  1591 89.52 21.18 13 126 
accounting_year 2009           
audit_lag  1700 85.68 23.82 10 119 
 
 
    
43 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Panel B. Independent Variables 
Variable Observations Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
asset_return 8945 0.0465 0.0988 -1.0210 0.4927 
loss 9015 0.1362 0.3430 0 1 
leverage 8920 0.5476 0.3585 0.0510 5.5043 
zscore 8949 1.7546 2.3892 -26.9615 12.3027 
contingent_liability  8843 0.1773 0.3820 0 1 
opinion 9152 0.0905 0.2869 0 1 
audit_fee 7788 13.2027 0.7809 10.3090 19.2405 
Nsubsidiaries 7794 10.6848 13.5730 1 223 
auditor 9152 0.9301 0.2550 0 1 
change 8649 0.0946 0.2926 0 1 
Tshare 8972 0.5288 0.2171 0 1 
state_owned 9010 0.5355 0.4988 0 1 
concentration 9010 0.3775 0.1608 0.0082 1 
independent 8889 0.3554 0.0510 0 0.7143 
Nmeeting 9003 8.4752 3.5237 1 36 
good_news 4699 0.4541 0.4979 0 1 
surprise 5649 -0.0832 0.4205 -22.48 1.54 
size 9013 21.4079 1.3622 10.8422 30.0979 
exchange 8860 0.0710 0.2570 0 1 
restatement 9153 0.1112 0.3144 0 1 
regulatory_pressure 9015 0.0978 0.2971 0 1 
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Table 4 
Model 1 Determinants of Audit Reporting Lag 
Independent Variables: 
Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficients P-value 
 
  intercept ? 3.888  0.000  * 
 
asset_return - -0.634  0.000  * 
Audit loss + 0.047  0.154  
 
Risk leverage ? -0.100  0.079  
 
 
zscore - 0.000  0.966  
 
 
contingent_liability + 0.041  0.036  * 
  opinion + 0.156  0.001  * 
Audit audit_fee + 0.046  0.007  * 
Complexity Nsubsidiaries + 0.001  0.004  * 
Audit auditor + 0.030  0.370    
Expertise change + 0.049  0.045  * 
China Tshare ? -0.002  0.965    
Variables state_owned ? 0.018  0.237    
  concentration ? -0.017  0.738    
Corporate independent - -0.081  0.557  
 
Governance Nmeeting - -0.009  0.000  * 
Earnings good_news - -0.039  0.007  * 
Surprise surprise - -0.008  0.754    
Information  size - 0.004  0.664    
Demand exchange ? 0.029  0.406    
Earnings restatement + -0.035  0.117    
Quality regulatory_pressure ? -1.459  0.000  * 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Ln_audit_lag 
    
Number of obs 2826 
    
F( 30,  2795) 9.380  
    
Prob > F 0.000  
    
R-squared 0.092  
    
Adj R-squared 0.082  
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Table 6 
Sensitivity Tests 
Panel A. Exclude ST Firms 
    
Independent Variables: 
Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficients P-value 
 
  intercept ? 3.867  0.000  * 
 
asset_return - -0.788  0.000  * 
Audit loss + 0.031  0.351  
 
Risk leverage ? -0.085  0.164  
 
 
zscore - 0.003  0.730  
 
 
contingent_liability + 0.042  0.031  * 
  opinion + 0.163  0.002  * 
Audit audit_fee + 0.047  0.005  * 
Complexity Nsubsidiaries + 0.001  0.007  * 
Audit auditor + 0.030  0.369    
Expertise change + 0.043  0.084    
China Tshare ? 0.011  0.787    
Variables state_owned ? 0.021  0.162    
  concentration ? 0.000  0.794    
Corporate independent - -0.066  0.630  
 
Governance Nmeeting - -0.009  0.000  * 
Earnings good_news - -0.035  0.016  * 
Surprise surprise - -0.020  0.434    
Information  size - 0.003  0.763    
Demand exchange ? 0.027  0.436    
Earnings restatement + -0.032  0.151    
Quality regulatory_pressure ? -0.001  0.973    
Dependent 
Variable: 
Ln_audit_lag 
    
Number of obs 2771 
    
Prob > F 0.000  
    
R-squared 0.092  
    
Adj R-squared 0.083  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
Table 6 (Continued) 
Panel B. Drop Earnings Surprise Variables 
Independent Variables: 
Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficients P-value 
 
  intercept ? 3.438  0.000  * 
 
asset_return - -0.477  0.000  * 
Audit loss + 0.092  0.000  * 
Risk leverage ? -0.046  0.055  
 
 
zscore - 0.002  0.569  
 
 
contingent_liability + 0.021  0.108    
  opinion + 0.116  0.000  * 
Audit audit_fee + 0.053  0.000  * 
Complexity Nsubsidiaries + 0.001  0.024  * 
Audit auditor + 0.023  0.351    
Expertise change + 0.052  0.001  * 
China Tshare ? 0.014  0.645    
Variables state_owned ? 0.010  0.320    
  concentration ? -0.114  0.001  * 
Corporate independent - -0.107  0.246  
 
Governance Nmeeting - -0.008  0.000  * 
Information  size - -0.002  0.704    
Demand exchange ? 0.039  0.085    
Earnings restatement + -0.017  0.257    
Quality regulatory_pressure ? (omitted)     
Dependent 
Variable: 
Ln_audit_lag 
    
Number of obs 5622         
Prob > F 0.000  
    
R-squared 0.090  
    
Adj R-squared 0.086          
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Table 6 (Continued) 
Panel C. Auditor Change (Alternative Definition) 
   
Independent Variables: 
Predicted 
Sign 
Coefficients P-value 
 
  intercept ? 3.895  0.000  * 
 
asset_return - -0.635  0.000  * 
Audit loss + 0.047  0.152  
 
Risk leverage ? -0.100  0.081  
 
 
zscore - 0.000  0.953  
 
 
contingent_liability + 0.041  0.034  * 
  opinion + 0.155  0.001  * 
Audit audit_fee + 0.046  0.007  * 
Complexity Nsubsidiaries + 0.001  0.005  * 
Audit auditor + 0.025  0.456    
Expertise change + 0.049  0.043  * 
China Tshare ? -0.001  0.978    
Variables state_owned ? 0.018  0.230    
  concentration ? -0.017  0.737    
Corporate independent - -0.080  0.562  
 
Governance Nmeeting - -0.009  0.000  * 
Earnings good_news - -0.039  0.007  * 
Surprise surprise - -0.008  0.750    
Information  size - 0.004  0.664    
Demand exchange ? 0.026  0.445    
Earnings restatement + -0.035  0.118    
Quality regulatory_pressure ? -1.459  0.000  * 
Dependent 
Variable: 
Ln_audit_lag 
    
Number of obs 2826 
    
Prob > F 0.000  
    
R-squared 0.092  
    
Adj R-squared 0.082  
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Figure 1 
Audit Reporting Lags in China 
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